

MANDATORY FOR ARMENIA.

JUNE 3, 1920. —Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.

Mr. MOORES, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, submitted the following

REPORT.

[To accompany S. Con. Res. 27.]

The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to which was referred the resolution (S. Con. Res. 27), which declines to grant to the Executive the power to accept a mandate over Armenia, reports it back to the House, with the recommendation that the resolution do pass.

The acceptance of this mandate from the League of Nations means primarily that under the authority of the council of the league, in which the United States is not represented, we shall gratuitously undertake the tutelage of this territory and the defense of its inhabitants from wild and uncivilized tribes of nomadic peoples who have preyed on the Armenians for many generations. At all times we must be subject to the league council, to which we must make annual reports and which has the power explicitly to "define the degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the mandatory."

If it should still be thought desirable to accept the charge it must not be forgotten that upon well-established principles of law, if the Congress should accept from the council of the league a mandate for Armenia, either by act of Congress or by joint resolution, or make an appropriation to carry out the mandate, such action may amount to an unreserved ratification of the covenant of the League of Nations, and will certainly create an estoppel which will prevent the Government from denying that it is subject to the council of the League of Nations.

AUTHORITIES.

THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Article 22 of the covenant of the League of Nations contains these provisions:

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by the peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous

conditions of the modern world there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this covenant.

The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be intrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience, or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the league.

The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions, and other similar circumstances.

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory.

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In every case of mandate the mandatory shall render to the council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the members of the league, be explicitly defined in each case by the council.

Vattel thus defines the word "treaty":

A treaty, in Latin *foedus*, is a compact made with a view to the public welfare by the superior power, either for perpetuity, or for a considerable time.

All rulers of States have not a power to make public treaties by their own authority alone; some are obliged to take the advice of a Senate, or of the representatives of a nation. It is from the fundamental laws of each State that we must learn where resides the authority that is capable of contracting with validity in the name of the State. (Vattel's Law of Nations, p. 192, secs. 152-154.)

The word is thus defined by Chief Justice Marshall:

A treaty is, in its nature, a contract between two nations. (*Foster v. Neilson*, 2 Pet. 253, 315.)


Fuller definitions have been given by our Supreme Court:

An agreement or contract between two or more nations or sovereigns, entered into by agents appointed for that purpose, and duly sanctioned by the supreme power of the respective parties. (*Cherokee Nation v. Georgia*, 5 Pet. 1, 60.)

An agreement, league, or contract between two or more nations or sovereigns, formally signed by commissioners properly authorized, and solemnly ratified by the sovereigns or the supreme power of each State. In its essence it is a contract. It differs from an ordinary contract only in being an agreement between independent States instead of private parties. (*Fourteen Diamond Rings*, 183 U. S. 176, 182; 38 Cyc. 962.)

There can be no question under these authorities that a treaty is nothing more or less than a contract between sovereign States; and it necessarily follows the laws governing contracts between private parties also govern treaties. The officers who negotiate treaties are simply agents of the State; and the law of principal and agent applies to them, as to private agents. Their irregular or unauthorized acts are subject to the law of ratification; and to ratifications which may have been irregular or informal, the courts have very properly applied the law of estoppel.

The treaty of peace with Germany was negotiated and signed on the part of the United States of America, or in its own language, "the President of the United States of America, by the honorable Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, acting in his own name and by his own proper authority: the honorable Robert Lansing, Secretary of State; the honorable Henry White, formerly ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the United States



at Rome and Paris; the honorable Edward M. House; Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, military representative of the United States on the supreme war council."

It was presented by these negotiators to the President for approval and was by him referred to the Senate of the United States for ratification, where it failed of ratification by a two-thirds vote.

These plenipotentiaries or commissioners, whether officers or not, were merely agents of the United States, possessing such power of negotiating as had been expressly granted them; and to them and all of their acts the common law of agency must be applied.

In the words of Mr. Justice Brewer:

All officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, are but agents with delegated powers, who must act within legally prescribed limitations. *United States v. Maxwell Land-Grant Co.*, 21 Fed. 19, 23.)

The general principles governing the relation of principal and agent to each other apply in the case of Government agencies. (39 Cyc. 706.)

A public office is an agency for the State, and the person whose duty it is to perform this agency is a public officer. (*Clark v. Stanley*, 66 N. C. 59; *Throop Public Officers*, section 3; 39 Cyc. 706.)

So far as the United States is concerned, the treaty of Versailles is not now binding, having failed of ratification by the Senate as provided in the Constitution. It is to be seen whether under the law of agency it is still susceptible of ratification by some legal method not provided in the treaty-making section of the Constitution.

RATIFICATION.

Ratification is thus defined:

The doctrine of ratification presents at once one of the most unique and characteristic chapters in the law of agency, and also one of the most important. The idea that one who was not actually a party to a contract—though he was one nominally—may actually become one by some subsequent act of his own without new consideration or the assent of the other party; or that one who was not really a participant in a trespass or other wrong—though it was done on his account—may become responsible for it subsequently merely by assenting to it, would, as has been stated, seem very strange, if it had not become so familiar.

It is, however, a very old idea. The Roman law had manifestations of it. It appears at an early date in our English law. The French civil code and the German civil code recognize and to some extent regulate it. In the Scotch law it is usually termed "homologation."

Ratification may briefly be defined as the subsequent adoption and affirmance by one person of an act which another, without authority, has previously assumed to do for him while purporting to act as his agent. (*Meecham on Agency* secs. 345, 347.)

It may be important here to appreciate the difference between ratification and estoppel. The same author has well stated it, as follows:

Ratification, moreover, differs from estoppel, though they are often very closely associated. Estoppel requires that the party alleging it shall have done something or omitted to do something, in reliance on the other party's conduct, by which he will now be prejudiced if the facts are shown to be different from those upon which he relied. Ratification requires no such change of condition or prejudice; if the principal ratifies, the other party may simply avail himself of it. As soon as ratification takes place, the act stands as an authorized one, and not merely as one whose effect the principal may be estopped to deny. If there be ratification, there is no occasion to resort to estoppel. There may, however, be cases in which one may be estopped to deny that he has ratified.

The difference in effect may be striking, ratification is retroactive, estoppel operates upon that done after the act and in reliance upon it; ratification makes the whole act good from the beginning, while estoppel may only extend to so much as can be shown to be affected by the estopping conduct. (*Meecham on Agency*, sec. 349.)

The same author has this to say as to ratification by the State:

Beginning with the highest grade of organization known, it is settled that the State not only may have agents, binding it by virtue of a previous authorization, but it may also incur liability subsequently by ratifying acts and contracts made on its behalf. (Mecham on Agency, sec. 266.)

The legislature may ratify an unauthorized contract made by a State officer unless in contravention of the constitution, and a portion of a contract may be so ratified without ratifying it all. The ratification can only be by the legislature, and only by a law passed by both branches of the legislature; and the act of ratification must be so explicit and definite as to show an intention to recognize and adopt the unauthorized contract. It is not necessary, however, that the ratification should be in direct terms. It may be effected by legislation recognizing the act as valid. Thus, bringing suit on the contract may amount to a ratification, and an appropriation of money for the payment of a claim arising under the contract may be so made as to constitute a ratification, and the State may also ratify a contract by taking advantage of it. (36 Cyc., 879.)

In the history of our Government, treaties have frequently been in effect, ratified by the Government, after the Senate had rejected them. The annexation of Texas is a well-known instance. The Republic of Texas achieved its independence from Mexico in 1836. April 12, 1844, a treaty was signed at Washington with the Republic of Texas providing for the annexation of Texas to the Union. June 8, 1844, this treaty was rejected by the Senate by an adverse vote of 35 to 16, more than two-thirds of the Senators having voted against it. March 1, 1845, a joint resolution was approved consenting to the erection of the territory rightfully belonging to the Republic of Texas into a new State, and Texas, having accepted and complied with the conditions of the resolution, was admitted by a joint resolution approved December 29, 1845, as a State into the Union. (Crandall, Treaties, p. 135; IV Richardson's Messages, 386.)

Much the same circumstances surrounded the annexation of the Territory of Hawaii. An annexation treaty had been negotiated by President Harrison, which was withdrawn by President Cleveland in April, 1893. This treaty was returned to the Senate for its approval by President McKinley, after being signed at Washington June 16, 1897. This treaty was ratified by the Hawaiian Legislature, but not by our Senate, and the cession was accepted and confirmed and the treaty ratified on the part of the United States by a joint resolution approved July 7, 1898. (30 Stat. L. 750; 2 Supp. R. S. U. S. 895; Crandall on Treaties, p. 139.)

Many other instances might be stated.

ESTOPPEL APPLIES TO THE UNITED STATES.

There is, however, the highest authority for the proposition that the State may be estopped and is generally bound by an estoppel. This is assuredly true of an estoppel by deed or legislative act. In *Fletcher v. Peck* (6 Cranch. 83, 137) the Supreme Court considered the case where the State of Georgia was held estopped by the act of its legislature, Chief Justice Marshall saying:

A contract executed is one in which the object of the contract is performed; and this, says Blackstone, differs in nothing from a grant. The contract between Georgia and the purchasers was executed by the grant. A contract executed, as well as one which is executory, contains obligations binding on the parties. A grant, in its own nature, amounts to an extinguishment of the right of the grantor and implies a contract not to reassert that right. A party is therefore always estopped by his own grant.

Stephen Girard had devised the bulk of his estate for charitable purposes, and the Legislature of Pennsylvania had passed two acts to enable the city of Philadelphia to accept and execute certain trusts under the will, when it was attacked in the courts by the heirs at law charging the incapacity of the city to accept the trusts so created, among various allegations. In the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States Mr. Justice Story, speaking for the court after quoting from the two acts referred to, says:

Here, then, there is a positive authority conferred upon the city authorities to act upon the trusts under the will, and to administer the same through the instrumentality of agents appointed by them. No doubt can then be entertained that the legislature meant to affirm the entire validity of those trusts, and the entire competency of the corporation to take and hold the property devised upon the trusts named in the will.

It is true that this is not a judicial decision, and entitled to full weight and confidence as such. But it is a legislative exposition and confirmation of the competency of the corporation to take the property and execute the trusts; and, if those trusts were valid in point of law, the legislature would be estopped thereafter to contest the competency of the corporation to take the property and execute the trusts, either upon a quo warranto or any other proceeding, by which it should seek to divest the property, and invest other trustees with the execution of the trusts upon the ground of any supposed incompetency of the corporation. (*Vidal v. Girard's Executors*, 2 How. 126, 191.)

To much the same effect, see *Branson v. Wirth* (17 Wall. 32, 42).

By the act of October 30, 1794, the legislature (of Vermont) granted to the town of Berlin, forever, the use of this land for the benefit of the town. The State thereby parted with all the interest it had in these lands and is estopped thereby from claiming any right thereto. That the doctrine of estoppel applies to a State as well as to private persons can not be questioned. It was so considered by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in the case of *Commonwealth v. Pejepscut Proprietors*, 10 Mass. 155. (*Vermont v. Society for Propagation of Gospel*, 2 Paine, 545; 28 Fed. Cas. 1157.)

In another like case, Circuit Judge Walter Q. Gresham, at one time Secretary of State, uses the following language:

Resolute good faith should characterize the conduct of States in their dealings with individuals, and there is no reason, in morals or law, that will exempt them from the doctrine of estoppel. (*Commonwealth v. Andre*, 3 Pick. 224; *Commonwealth v. Pejepscut Proprietors*, 10 Mass. 155; *People v. Society*, 2 Paine 545; *State v. Bailey*, 19 Ind. 452; *People v. Maynard*, 15 Mich. 463; *Cahn v. Barnes*, 5 Fed. 326. (*Indiana v. Milk*, 11 Fed. 389, 397; see also 16 Cyc. 714.)

To the effect that the State is subject to the law of estoppel see the following additional cases: *Stone v. Bank of Kentucky* (174 U. S. 799), *Cunningham v. Shanklin* (60 Ca. 118), *State ex rel. Smyth v. Kennedy* (60 Nebr. 300), *State v. Ober* (34 La. Ann. 359), *State v. Taylor* (28 La. Ann. 460), *St. Paul & P. R. Co. v. Schurmeier* (7 Wall. 272), *Chicago & St. P. M. & O. R. Co. v. Douglas County* (134 Wis. 197, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1074).

The law being as stated, it necessarily follows that, if the Congress accepts from the Council of the League of Nations a mandate for Armenia either by act or by joint resolution, or makes any appropriation to carry out the purpose of the mandate referred to, such action may amount to a ratification of the covenant of the League of Nations without any reservation whatever; and certainly will estop both the Congress and the Nation from denying that the Nation is subject to the council of the League of Nations, wholly without regard to the question of its right to representation in the council and the league, and any rights it may be supposed to have acquired by the treaty of Versailles.

WHAT IS A MANDATORY?

The President has urged the Congress to accept for the United States an assignment by the representatives of the League of Nations as mandatory for Armenia.

The covenant of the League of Nations, by article 22, contemplates generally protectorates for territories "inhabited by the peoples not yet able to stand by themselves," providing "that the tutelage of such peoples should be intrusted to advanced nations, who by reason of their resources, their experience, or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories in behalf of the league."

Certain duties are imposed by the covenant on the mandatories, clearly manifesting that all mandatories are subject to the council.

The following statement of duties may be quoted:

In every case of mandate, the mandatory shall render to the council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the members of the league, be explicitly defined in each case by the council.

A permanent commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the mandatories and to advise the council on all matters relating to the observances of the mandates.

The very name "mandatory" is unfamiliar. Under another spelling the word has been defined by our Supreme Court:

Persons who have gratuitously agreed to perform certain duties, and who are therefore bound to apply ordinary skill and diligence, but no more. (*Briggs v. Spaulding*, 141 U. S. 132, 148.)

The law of *mandatum* is of Roman origin and is analogous to the modern law of agency. The name has survived in the Louisiana Mandate, the French Mandat, the Italian and Spanish Mandato. The principle also exists under the German civil code.

Although the Roman *mandatum* was agency without remuneration, its fundamental rules as to the scope, revocation, and dissolution of an agent's authority underlie the modern law of all agency. (Sherman, *Roman Law in the Modern World*, sec. 800.)

One feature is especially worthy of mention. The principal may revoke the agent's authority at any time; but, while the agent may resign or renounce his authority, the resignation must not be untimely; if the renunciation is made at a time when the principal can not accomplish his object without suffering a detriment, the latter can bring an action at law against the agent. (*Ibid.*, sec. 803.)

In *Briggs v. Spaulding* (141 U. S. 132, 145), speaking of directors' liability, Fuller, Chief Justice, says, quoting Judge Sharswood in a Pennsylvania case:

They are undoubtedly said in many authorities to be trustees, but that, as I apprehend, is only in a general sense, and we term an agent or any other bailee intrusted with the care and management of the property of another. It is certain that they are not technical trustees. They can only be regarded as mandatories, persons who have gratuitously undertaken to perform certain duties, and who are therefore bound to apply ordinary skill and diligence, but no more. (*Sperling's App.* 71 Pa. St. 11, 20; *Marshall v. Nashville Ry. Co.*, 118 Tenn. 254; 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1246; 12 Ann. Cas. 675.)

It will be observed that with characteristic ambiguity the President in his message speaks of the conference of statesmen now sitting at San Remo for the purpose of working out the details of peace with the Central Powers as the "Council at San Remo" making the offer; and urges "the acceptance of the invitation now formally and solemnly extended to us by the council at San Remo," and that in his message he quotes from the covenant of the league. The offer, in fact, comes from a conference of the three premiers of England, France, and Italy at San Remo, whose "definite appeal" to this Government to accept the mandate for Armenia appears to be simply in the nature of an inquiry whether if the mandate is offered by the league council the American Congress will accept the mandate and bear the entire burden of acceptance.



MANDATE FOR ARMENIA.

JUNE 4, 1920.—Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.

Mr. FLOOD, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, submitted the following

MINORITY VIEWS.

[To accompany S. Con. Res. 27.]

Senate concurrent resolution 27:

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the Congress hereby respectfully declines to grant to the Executive the power to accept a mandate over Armenia, as requested by the message of the President dated May 24, 1920.

The purpose of this concurrent resolution is to preclude the President of the United States from accepting the mandate for Armenia. The text of the resolution goes far beyond that. Its language is a direct, deliberate, gratuitous insult to the head of the Nation. It not only withholds authority to the President to accept a request made to him by the supreme council for a people in whom America and Americans always have had a peculiar and special interest, but it injects the spirit of political partisanship into a question of importance to peace and civilization and flings an affront to the President.

The minority members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs supported a resolution as a substitute for the Senate resolution, which provided that Congress should not pass upon the request of the President to be given authority to accept a mandate for Armenia until treaties of peace have been ratified by the Central Powers. They proposed that more time be permitted for mature study of the subject before Congress shall take such action as would render reconsideration of the matter impossible. There are many people who faithfully reflect lofty American ideals whose views apparently have not been taken into consideration.

This question should not be decided arbitrarily and peremptorily. There should be opportunity, when the question of ratification of the peace treaties is finally disposed of, to determine, unhampered by any premature action, whether the American people should have the opportunity of assisting in bringing about a suitable government in Armenia. Congress at this time is not prepared to exercise a snap

judgment foreclosing any action in behalf of Armenia. The United States is a world power, and it, among all the nations of the earth, should be the last to shirk a serious responsibility.

There is a great deal of confusion and misinterpretation regarding the scope and effect of the proposed mandate for Armenia. It does not entail the wide scope of expenditures and responsibilities indicated by the report of Gen. Harbord, so often referred to in the discussion of this subject. The Armenian mandate would apply only to approximately one-seventh of the area contemplated by Gen. Harbord. The proposed mandate does not mean involving this country in war. It does not mean interference in the slightest way with the integrity of the territory of Russia. It does not mean that the United States by accepting such a mandate would come under the League of Nations. It does not mean that the United States would in any sense be subordinate or responsible to any other nation.

The effect of a mandate would be to make the United States an administrative and fiscal adviser of the Armenian people with a view to preserving to civilization a country in which millions of American people are sentimentally, pecuniarily, religiously, or otherwise interested. Armenia by its natural growth would evolve its own reclamation into normal conditions. The mandate as proposed contemplates a definite expression, by definite act and not by mere words, of the special interest of the United States in a people for whom in the past the American people have contributed many millions of dollars, for whom relief organizations have been created in the past to put into effect the warm sympathetic interest America feels for Armenia, and in whose country the United States has millions of dollars of property interests. Such a mandate would be a powerful deterrent to any aggressive ambitions of neighboring States toward the Armenia that is so close to the hearts of many Americans. A mandate would redeem the reputation of the Government and people of the United States for consistency in their declarations with respect to Armenia.

Much of the opposition to the mandate for Armenia has been based upon misconceptions growing out of Gen. Harbord's report. Gen. Harbord approached the subject in the spirit of a military commander with a broad perspective, with ideal and perfect conditions as a standard and with a view to building that devastated and depopulated country—preyed upon by its great enemy, the Turks, the allies of the countries with which the United States was at war—to a complete enlightened condition comparable to conditions among the greater powers of the world. He had in mind a mandate over Transcaucasia and all of the Ottoman Empire (except Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Hedjaz, and Thrace). This would have approximated an area of 343,000 square miles while the Armenia contemplated in the present proposal of a mandate embraces only 56,000 square miles.

The Armenia involved in the proposal for a mandate now under discussion is made up of the following regions:

- (1) The area in Transcaucasia under the effective control of the present Armenian Government—about 20,000 square miles.
- (2) The area of the four former Turkish vilayets (Van, Erzerum, Bitlis and Trebizond), mentioned in section 6, article 89 of the

French text of the Turkish peace treaty (excluding non-Armenian sections)—about 36,000 square miles.

The estimates are that there would be a total of approximately 3,000,000 people in the future Armenian state.

The proposal of a mandate submitted to Congress does not mean an embarkation on the great expenditures which the Harbord report tended to indicate. The military help to be extended to Armenia would not be as formidable as has been claimed. On the contrary, the presence of any number of American soldiers in Armenia, and the showing of the American flag there, doubtless would have a restraining effect on the neighbors of the Armenians and would tend to avert any fighting.

It should be borne in mind in this connection that—

(a) There is an Armenian army which, when properly equipped and officered, can defend the Armenian boundaries and secure order within the country;

(b) According to the Turkish treaty, the Turkish territory adjacent to Armenia would be demilitarized; and

(c) Obligatory military service in Turkey is to be suppressed and the Turkish Army reduced to a maximum force of 50,000, including the constabulary.

If the United States, giving definite and real expression to its sympathetic interest in the Armenian people, should accept a mandate for Armenia, it would at the same time control the finances of Armenia. All the Armenian revenues would thus pass through the hands of an American controller and the United States Government naturally would be in a position to make certain that the Armenian revenues would reimburse any sums spent by the United States under such a mandate.

President Wilson has expressed the American feeling of deep interest in Armenian affairs in saying that:

The sympathy for Armenia among our people has sprung from untainted consciences, pure Christian faith, and an earnest desire to see Christian people succored in their time of suffering.

The intimate relations between America and Armenia date back to about 1830, when the American religious and educational work began in the Near East. It was through the pioneer American missionaries that America learned of the existence of the Christian people of Armenia. American missionary enterprise among the Armenians, at first almost entirely religious, developed into educational work, and these two branches of American enterprise have created a deep and lasting influence over the entire system of the Armenian religious and educational organizations.

A mandate for Armenia would be only a continuation of the moral, intellectual, and sympathetic interest which America has exercised on the Armenians for nearly a century. The influence of American educational institutions among the Armenians always has been strong and far-reaching. Thousands of Armenian children have been educated in the numerous American colleges, high schools, and other educational institutions in the Near East. In these schools broad, sound American education is given and practically in every one of them, according to the grade of the schools, a certain amount of English is taught and textbooks in the English language are used.

Many of the graduates of these American colleges have become teachers in the Armenian schools and colleges. A large number of those who studied in the Armenian schools have come to the United States, many settling as useful American citizens, and others, after further studies in American universities or after learning some trade in America, have returned to Armenia with stronger American ideas and ready to spread throughout Armenia the American ideas as they received them in this country. With American education and American ideas, American mode of living has been introduced among certain classes of Armenians, followed by the natural desire on their part to use American equipment and supplies in the various arts and crafts of Armenia.


Besides these activities, American medical mission work, with numerous American hospitals and dispensaries, has been instituted by Americans in Armenia and American textbooks, newspapers, and other publications have been given wide circulation in Armenia.

Americans have rendered notable relief work in Armenia, particularly after the Turkish massacres of Armenians in 1895-96 and 1915-16. A large number of American men and women, often at the risk of their own lives, did everything humanly possible to find food, clothing, and shelter for the survivors of the massacres of 1895-96; they procured cattle, seed, and agricultural implements for the peasants and they founded orphanages for the thousands of Armenian orphans. They induced the Armenians to rebuild their destroyed homes, schools, and churches. The Americans again were in the fore in the relief work in the subsequent massacres. The American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief raised millions of dollars and the American people never wavered in cheerfully contributing to the Armenians.

Through American effort and generosity since the year 1915, thousands of Armenian lives have been saved and children and women rescued from bondage and from conditions worse than bondage. It may be almost said that the creation of the Armenian State would not have been possible but for America and its unflinching, unstinted, sympathetic acts.

Ever since 1830 there has been a strong bond between the American and Armenian peoples. Both through the individualistic character of the Armenians, through their long contact with Americans, the Armenians, more than any other people in the Near East, are ready to follow American leadership, American advice, and welcome American help and American cooperation. Armenians know America and have faith and confidence in our institutions. For 90 years they have experienced American religious and educational guardianship. Such a mandate as that which has been under discussion would be merely a consummation of American work begun 90 years ago. Many of the great American religious denominations, ecclesiastical and other organizations in this country, have expressed, through resolutions and otherwise sent to the President of the United States and to the Department of State, their strong desire to see the United States take a mandate over Armenia or to extend a helping hand toward the Armenian people.

H. D. FLOOD.
CHAS. M. STEDMAN.
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